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Abstract
According to Crain and Nakayama (1987), when forming complex yes/no questions, children do not
make errors such as Is the boy who smoking is crazy? because they have innate knowledge of structure
dependence and so will not move the auxiliary from the relative clause. However, simple recurrent
networks are also able to avoid such errors, on the basis of surface distributional properties of the input
(Lewis & Elman, 2001; Reali & Christiansen, 2005). Two new elicited production studies revealed
that (a) children occasionally produce structure-dependence errors and (b) the pattern of children’s
auxiliary-doubling errors (Is the boy who is smoking is crazy?) suggests a sensitivity to surface co-
occurrence patterns in the input. This article concludes that current data do not provide any support for
the claim that structure dependence is an innate constraint, and that it is possible that children form a
structure-dependent grammar on the basis of exposure to input that exhibits this property.
Keywords: Structure dependence; Yes/no questions; Complex syntax; Poverty of stimulus argument;
Language acquisition; Relative clause
A central question in the cognitive sciences is how children come to acquire their native
language. Dating back to Chomsky (1959), a popular view has been that children “attain
knowledge of the structure of their language for which no evidence is available in the data
to which they are exposed as children” (Hornstein & Lightfoot, 1981, p. 9) or, as in the title
of a recent article by Lidz, Waxman, and Freedman (2003), that “infants know [facts] about
syntax that they couldn’t have learned” (p. B65), and hence that certain syntactic principles
or constraints must be innately specified in the genome.
Perhaps the “parade case” (Crain, 1991) of such a constraint is that of structure dependence;
the principle that grammatical rules apply not to items that occupy a certain position in the
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sentence with respect to linear order, but to items that play a specific syntactic role with
respect to the hierarchical constituent-structure of the sentence. The example most often used
to illustrate this principle is that of yes/no questions (e.g., see Piatelli-Palmerini, 1980, p. 40),
which, by hypothesis, are formed by “moving” elements of an untransformed version of the
utterance (approximating to a declarative statement). On the basis of simple questions (1),
the child could hypothetically formulate a rule such as move the first auxiliary1to sentence
initial-position:
1a. The boy is crazy → 1b. Is the boy crazy?
This rule, however, would output an ungrammatical utterance for questions with more than
one auxiliary (“complex questions”):
2a. The boy who is smoking is crazy → 2b. ∗Is the boy who smoking is crazy?
In order to form such questions correctly, the child must formulate a structure-dependent rule
(e.g., move the auxiliary in the main clause to sentence-initial position), rather than a rule
based on the linear position of items in the sentence. This rule is structure dependent because
it makes reference to the notion of “main clause”—a constituent of the hierarchical sentence
structure—and not simply to items that occupy a certain position based on linear order.2
According to Chomsky (1980; see also Crain & Nakayama, 1987; and many others), the
input does not contain sufficient evidence that the structure-dependent generalization is the
correct one because “a person might go through much or all of his life without ever having
been exposed to relevant evidence” [presumably questions with two auxiliaries] (pp. 114–
115). Chomsky (1980) argued that because the child will “nevertheless unerringly employ the
structure-dependent generalization on the first relevant occasion” (p. 145), she must be innately
constrained to consider only structure-dependent rules when formulating her grammar.
The claim that complex yes/no questions are extremely rare in child-directed speech is
well supported. In a search of approximately 3 million caregiver utterances in the CHILDES
database, MacWhinney (2004) found only one complex yes/no question. Thus, unlike some
authors (e.g., Pullum & Scholz, 2002), our goal in this article is not to dispute the first part of
Chomsky’s (1980) claim; that children virtually never hear complex yes/no questions. Rather,
our goal is to reassess the second part of this claim—that children never make structure-
dependence errors—in the light of some recent findings from the field of computer science.
In doing so, we will also address the third part of Chomsky’s (1980) claim; that the (putative)
absence of such errors necessarily implies that structure dependence is an innately specified
constraint.
There are two possible sources of evidence to support the second part of Chomsky’s
(1980) claim—that children never make structure-dependence errors: naturalistic spontaneous
production data and experimental data. Although no structure-dependence errors are recorded
in the entire CHILDES database, neither is there a single instance of a child producing a well-
formed complex yes/no question (B. MacWhinney, 2004). Because we have no spontaneous
production data in which children are actually attempting to produce complex yes/no questions,
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employ the structure-dependent generalization on the first relevant occasion” (Chomsky, 1980,
p. 145).
Given the absence of appropriate contexts (i.e., attempts at complex yes/no questions)
in the available naturalistic data, the claim that children never make structure-dependence
errors rests critically on a single experimental study. Crain and Nakayama (1987) used an
elicited-production paradigm to elicit a range of complex yes/no questions with two instances
of copula/auxiliary BE (Experiment 1), or with one instance of copula is and one modal
auxiliary (Experiment 2), from 30 children aged 3;2 through 4;7. Although overall rates
of correct performance were only 60% and 21% for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, no
child made a structure-dependence error (e.g., see Question 2b). However, errors of auxiliary-
doubling (e.g., Is the boy who is smoking is crazy?) and resumption (e.g., Is the boy who
is smoking, is he crazy?) were common. Crain and Nakayama (1987, p. 142) therefore
concur with Chomsky (1980) that “only structure-dependent rules are formulated in language
acquisition.”
There are, however, three features of the design of Crain and Nakayama’s (1987) study that
would seem to work against the possibility of observing structure-dependence errors. First, the
study contained relatively few test trials. Second, the majority of the target questions used the
auxiliary with which children are probably most competent at forming questions (is), perhaps
reducing overall error rates. Third, the target questions were such that, in order to make
structure dependence errors, children would have had to strongly violate the co-occurrence
statistics of English.
With regard to the number of test trials, it is important to note that Crain and Nakayama’s
(1987) claim regarding the innateness of structure dependence depends crucially on the finding
of no structure-dependence errors. In order to make a theoretical claim on the basis of a null
effect, it is necessary to demonstrate that the phenomenon in question was not observed,
despite a large number of trials having been conducted. Crain and Nakayama elicited six
sentences from each of 30 participants (180 trials, Experiment 1) and four sentences from
each of 10 participants (40 trials, Experiment 2). This means that if structure-dependence
errors do occur, but only relatively rarely, say 5%, one would expect only about 10 errors
across both studies even if there were no other factors in the studies militating against the
child producing such errors (see below).
The majority of test sentences elicited by Crain and Nakayama (1987) included two in-
stances of copula/auxiliary is. This might be expected to reduce overall error rates (and hence
the likelihood of observing structure dependence errors), as young children seem to be rela-
tively competent at forming questions with this auxiliary. The test sentences elicited in Crain
and Nakayama’s Experiment 1 are reproduced in 3 through 8 (from p. 528):
3. The dog that is sleeping is on the blue bench → Is the dog that is sleeping on the blue
bench?
4. The ball that the girl is sitting on is big → Is the ball that the girl is sitting on big?
5. The boy who is watching Mickey Mouse is happy → Is the boy who is watching Mickey
Mouse happy?
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7. The boy who is being kissed by his mother is happy → Is the boy who is being kissed by
his mother happy?
8. The boy who was holding the plate is crying → Is the boy who was holding the plate
crying?
With the exception of (8), all these target sentences included two instances of cop-
ula/auxiliary is. This is potentially problematic because both naturalistic (e.g., Labov & Labov,
1978; Maratsos & Kuczaj, 1978; Rowland, 2007; Rowland, Pine, Lieven, & Theakston, 2005;
Stromswold, 1990) and experimental (Ambridge, Rowland, Theakston, & Tomasello, 2006;
Santelmann, Berk, Austin, Somashekar, & Lust, 2002; Valian & Casey, 2003) investigations
of children’s simple question production have found that BE (and in particular auxiliary is)
is generally associated with lower error rates than auxiliaries such as DO, CAN, or SHOULD
(although Santelmann et al. reported high error rates for copula BE). Ambridge et al. also
found a trend toward a higher error rate for the plural (are) than the singular (is) form of
auxiliary BE. This raises the possibility that structure-dependence errors might have been
observed in the study of Crain and Nakayama (1987) had these investigators elicited questions
with auxiliaries such as are, can, should, and do with which children are less proficient at
forming even simple questions.
The third potential shortcoming of the study of Crain and Nakayama (1987) is that the target
sentences were such that, in order to produce a structure-dependence error, children would
have had to have been willing to produce strings that strongly violate their knowledge of the
co-occurrence statistics of English; that is, knowledge of which words (or syntactic categories)
may follow one another (e.g., relativizer + auxiliary) and which (on the whole) may not (e.g.,
relativizer + participle). This point is best illustrated by the computer simulations of Lewis
and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005).
Lewis and Elman (2001) trained a simple recurrent network on a word prediction task:
The task of the network at each step was to predict the word that would be input at the
next step. More important, the input to the network consisted merely of strings of words.
No additional information about either the words themselves (e.g., grammatical category,
semantics) or the grammatical structure of the strings was given. In a training phase, the
network was presented with strings corresponding to questions containing a single auxiliary
(e.g., Is Mummy beautiful?) and declarative statements (e.g., Mummy is beautiful). Around 2%
of declarative statements contained a relative clause (e.g., The boy who is smoking is crazy).
Crucially, however, none of the questions presented to the network contained a relative clause.
That is, the network did not see any questions such as Is the boy who is smoking crazy? that
contain more than one auxiliary.
At test, the model was presented with successive words of complex questions such as Is
the boy who is smoking crazy? with the task of predicting, at each pass, the next word in
the string. Fig. 1 (reproduced from Lewis & Elman’s, 2001, Fig. 3) summarizes the model’s
predictions for successive words of the question Is the boy who is smoking crazy? The target
words are shown from left to right. The column corresponding to each target word displays
the average activation value for each of the syntactic categories shown. Following the initial
is, for example, the model predicts either a name/pronoun (e.g., Mummy) or a determiner (e.g.,
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Fig. 1. Lewis and Elman’s (2001) simple recurrent network’s predictions for successive words of the question Is
the boy who is smoking crazy? (reproduced from Lewis & Elman, 2001).
category information. The activation value shown for “DET,” for example, does not represent
the activation of a category of determiners—the model was given no such information—
but the average activation across all items that would be classified as such in the adult
grammar (the other category label whose referent may be unclear is REL for relativizer, e.g.,
who).
As Fig. 1 shows, the simple recurrent network (SRN) did not make predictions corre-
sponding to structure-dependence errors: After a string such as Is the boy who . . . the model
consistently predicted an auxiliary (e.g., is) and not a participle (e.g., smoking). Thus although
the model had never encountered any complex yes/no questions, it was able to avoid structure
dependence errors and, indeed, to make predictions corresponding to well-formed complex
questions.
The input to Lewis and Elman’s (2001) model was not real speech but a toy-grammar
designed to “crudely approximat[e] the structure of child directed speech” (p. 4). Reali and
Christiansen (2005; Experiment 3) replicated the SRN study of Lewis and Elman, using a
small and noisy corpus of child-directed speech (Bernstein-Ratner, 1984), tagged for lexical
category.3 More important, this corpus contained no examples of complex questions. Never-
theless Reali and Christiansen found that the network predicted the correct form of complex
questions over the corresponding structure-dependence error for 27 out of 30 test pairs.
In another study, Reali and Christiansen (2005; Experiment 1) used the transitional prob-
ability statistics of individual pairs and triplets (bi-/tri-grams) of untagged words from this
corpus to calculate a measure of probability of occurrence (cross-entropy) for correctly formed
and erroneous complex questions. On the basis of this corpus data (which contains no exam-
ples of this structure) correctly formed complex questions were shown to be statistically more
probable than corresponding structure-dependence errors for 96 of 100 test sentence pairs and
(Reali & Christiansen’s Experiment 2) for each of the six sentences in Crain and Nakayama’s
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and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen demonstrate that even when complex yes/no
questions are not present in the input, both local and long-distance categorical co-occurrence
statistics make structure-dependence errors unlikely to occur (although it should be acknowl-
edged that these error-rates, 10% and 4%, are higher than one might expect, given the results
of Crain & Nakayama, 1987; see also Kam, Stoyneshka, Tornyova, Fodor, & Sakas, 2005).
The studies of both Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005) highlight
a feature of the test sentences used by Crain and Nakayama (1987) that might be expected
to render the commission of structure-dependence errors particularly unlikely. An important
reason why the SRN simulations discussed do not predict structure-dependence errors is that
these errors contain bi-grams such as who smoking that virtually never occur in the input. The
same is true of the target sentences in Crain and Nakayama’s Experiment 1. In order to produce
an error, children would have had to produce strings such as that sleeping or who unhappy,
which occur with almost zero frequency in the input (at either the lexical level or the level
of syntactic categories: relativizer + particple/adjective). It is possible, then, that structure-
dependence errors would have been observed in the study of Crain and Nakayama had these
authors elicited questions for which such errors contain strings that are less inconsistent with
the bi-gram statistics of English.
Structure-dependence errors with modal auxiliaries such as CAN (9) or SHOULD are
less inconsistent with the bi-gram statistics of English than formally equivalent errors with
auxiliary BE (10):
9. The boy who can run fast can jump high → ∗Can the boy who run fast can jump high?
10. Theboy who is running fast is jumping high →∗Is the boy who running fast is jumping
high?
This is because whilst structure-dependence errors with BE contain an extremely low fre-
quency bi-gram (e.g., who running), formally equivalent errors with modal auxiliaries (e.g.,
CAN) contain a bi-gram (e.g., who run), which is likely to have occurred in the input with
far greater frequency, as part of sentences with plural subjects (e.g., Boys who run fast are
popular).4 Thus Crain and Nakayama’s (1987, Experiment 1) use of copula/auxiliary BE as
opposed to modal auxiliaries would appear to render the commission of structure-dependence
errors particularly unlikely.
In a second experiment, Crain and Nakayama (1987) did elicit questions containing the
modal auxiliaries can and should. However, the nature of these questions (in particular the
fact that they also contained one instance of copula is) meant that the relevant bi-grams (who
happy, who unhappy, who working) were—except for the case of who see—of extremely low
frequency. The fact that these questions contained two different auxiliaries (one instance of
copula is and one modal) is also likely to have worked against the possibility of structure
dependence errors being committed. To see why this is the case, consider the theoretically-
possible structure-dependence errors shown below (derived from the sentences in Crain &
Nakayama, 1987, p. 535):
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12. The boy who is unhappy should fix his TV set →∗Is the boy who unhappy should fix his
TV set?
13. The boy who can see Mickey Mouse is happy →∗Can the boy who see Mickey Mouse is
happy?
14. The boy who should be working is asleep →∗Should the boy who be working is asleep?
In Crain and Nakayama’s (1987) study, children were given a declarative statement
(e.g., the boy who is watching Mickey Mouse is happy or the boy who can see Mickey
Mouse is happy) in an indirect question frame (I wonder if . . . ), with the task of pro-
ducing utterances that question the truth value of these statements (e.g., Is the boy who
is watching Mickey Mouse happy? or Is the boy who can see Mickey Mouse happy?). On
the assumption that children understand the task, structure-dependence errors with two in-
stances of the same auxiliary (e.g., Is the boy who watching Mickey Mouse is happy?)
may be more likely to be produced than structure-dependence errors with different aux-
iliaries (e.g., Can the boy who see Mickey Mouse is happy?) as the former but not the
latter can reasonably be construed as questioning the truth value of the declarative state-
ment presented in the experimenter’s indirect question frame. That is, only errors of the
former type can reasonably be interpreted as utterances that are consistent with the semantics
of the target question. Thus Crain and Nakayama’s decision to use two different auxil-
iaries in Experiment 2 may have reduced the likelihood of structure-dependence errors being
observed.
In summary, despite the widely held view to the contrary, evidence that children never
produce structure-dependence errors, producing a correctly formed complex yes/no question
“on the first relevant occasion” (Chomsky, 1980, p. 145) is extremely thin. Currently available
naturalistic data are irrelevant to the argument, as even the largest corpora do not include
any attempts at the relevant structure. The only evidence in support of this claim comes
from a single experimental study (Crain & Nakayama, 1987) the design of which rendered
the observation of structure-dependence errors particularly unlikely. Only six (Experiment
1) and four questions (Experiment 2) were elicited from 30 and 10 children, respectively.
Experiment 1 used exclusively copula/auxiliary BE (in the form is, in all but one case).
Compared to auxiliaries such as CAN, DO, and SHOULD copula/auxiliary BE is unlikely
to attract structure-dependence errors for two reasons: (a) Even young children are relatively
proficient at forming questions with this auxiliary (particularly is) and (b) such errors strongly
violate the transitional probability statistics of English. Experiment 2 used modal auxiliaries,
thus avoiding the first shortcoming. However, all but one of the four questions elicited suffered
from the second shortcoming, and all suffered the potentially more serious shortcoming that
any possible structure-dependence error would be semantically inconsistent with the target
question.
The goal of this article is to reassess Crain and Nakayama’s (1987) claim that children never
make structure-dependence errors, in light of the evidence discussed above that certain specific
design-features of this study may have contributed to this null finding. In particular, we investi-
gate the possibility raised by the studies of Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen
(2005) that surface distributional properties of English might influence the likelihood of such
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be observed for questions with the modal auxiliary CAN for which such errors violate the
bi-gram statistics of English less strongly than for Crain and Nakayama’s stimuli. Experi-
ment 2 investigated whether the patterning of another error type was influenced by surface
co-occurrence statistics, which would suggest some sensitivity to these statistics on the part of
children.
1. Experiment 1
We argued earlier that structure-dependence errors are particularly unlikely to be observed
for complex questions with two instances of copula/auxiliary is (Crain & Nakayama’s, 1987,
Experiment 1) because (a) children are relatively proficient at forming questions with this
auxiliary and (b) such errors contain bi-grams (e.g., who running) that strongly violate the
transitional probability statistics of English. We further argued that structure-dependence
errors are unlikely to be observed for questions with one instance of auxiliary is and one
modal auxiliary (Crain & Nakayama’s, 1987, Experiment 2) because they result in a question
that is semantically inconsistent with the target question. Experiment 1 of the present study
investigated whether structure-dependence errors would be observed for complex questions
with two instances of the modal auxiliary CAN. Such errors do not so strongly violate the
transitional probability statistics of English because they contain bi-grams that appear as part
of sentences with plural subjects (e.g., who run) and are readily interpretable (e.g., *Can the
boy who run fast can jump high?).
1.1. Method
1.1.1. Participants
Participants were 22 normally developing monolingual English-speaking children (11 girls
and 11 boys) aged 6;3 to 7;9 (M = 6; 9), recruited from schools in the North West of England.
Compared to the children studied by Crain and Nakayama (1987; mean age of 4;3), these
children were relatively old. Although older children might be expected to exhibit lower
overall error rates, it was felt that they would be likely to produce more valid attempts the full
target questions than younger children (who may give up, ask a simple question instead, or
use a “restarting” strategy).
Table 1
Example target questions for Experiment 1 (CAN questions)
Transitivity No. of Subject Target Question
Intransitive Singular Can the boy who can run fast jump high?
Intransitive Plural Can the boys who can run fast jump high?
Transitive Singular Can the boy who can play the piano play the guitar?
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1.1.2. Design
Singular- and plural-subject versions of eight different can . . . can questions—four tran-
sitive and four intransitive—were constructed for a total of 16 trials per participant (see
Appendix A). Four example questions are shown in Table 1. All children completed all 16
trials.
1.1.3. Materials
A toy dog with an internal loudspeaker connected to a minidisc player was used to provide
responses to children’s questions (see Ambridge et al., 2006), whilst a second minidisc player
connected to a Shure SM58 Microphone was used to record children’s questions. Sixteen
two-sided cards were created; one for each target question. One side (the child side) showed
the scene about which the question was to be asked (e.g., one boy running fast and another
walking). The other (the dog side) depicted the answer (e.g., the boy who had been running
now performing a high jump, the other standing still).
1.1.4. Procedure
The experimental procedure was based on that of Crain and Nakayama (1987) and of
Ambridge et al. (2006). For each trial, the child selected a card (thus randomizing the order
of the trials), which the experimenter then placed in a stand such that one side faced the
child and the experimenter, whilst the other faced the dog. The experimenter then elicited a
question from the child by using an embedded yes/no question of the form I wonder if X,
and, subsequently, Ask the dog if X, where X was a statement containing a relative clause
(e.g., the boy who can run fast can jump high). After the child had attempted to produce the
relevant complex yes/no question, the experimenter operated the minidisc player to have the
dog provide an appropriate response.
Trials were presented in two sittings of eight trials each, given on consecutive days. Before
the first session, children completed three warm-up trials, which were designed to familiarize
children with the experimental procedure, but to avoid training them on the actual question
types used in the test trials. The target questions for the warm-up trials were Is the boy happy?
(simple question) Is the girl who has brown hair happy? and Is the boy who has a football
happy? (complex questions with different auxiliaries).
1.1.5. Transcription and coding
Responses were recorded onto minidisc, then transferred to computer for subsequent tran-
scription. The second author served as both experimenter and primary transcriber. Forty of the
352 individual trials (11%, randomly selected) were additionally transcribed by the first author
for reliability analysis. No mismatches were observed. Each response was then assigned to
one of the following mutually exclusive categories:
 Correct question: A correctly formed question such as, Can the boy who can run fast jump
high? Substitutions of that or which for who (the only such substitutions that occurred)
were permitted. No other substitutions (e.g., of either auxiliary, of the main verb or of noun
phrases [NPs]) were permitted for questions scored as correct. Although they slightly alter
the semantics of the question, questions with a short-form relative clause (e.g., Can the
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questions. Short-form questions for singular subjects where children changed the form of
the main verb to create agreement with the subject (e.g., Can the man who drives [for can
drive] cars drive tractors?) were scored as another subset of correct questions (short-form
+ agreement questions). However, trials for which participants substituted is + present
participle for can + bare stem (e.g., Can the girl who is making [for can make] cakes make
biscuits?) were scored as excluded.
 Auxiliary-doubling error5: Questions such as Can the boy who can run fast can jump high?
(Crain & Nakayama’s, 1987, Type 1 errors) were coded as auxiliary-doubling errors. To be
counted as an auxiliary-doubling error, the auxiliaries, both NPs and the lexical main verb
had to be exactly of the form modelled (although, again, substitutions of which or that for
who were permitted).
 Structure-dependence error: An error such as Can the boy who run fast can jump high? or
Can the boys who run fast can jump high? For a number of would-be structure-dependence
errors with singular sentence subjects, children replaced the bare-stem main-verb form
with a simple verb form marked for “agreement” with the subject (e.g., *Can the girl
who make-s cakes can make biscuits). Note that the equivalent form for plural sentence
subjects (e.g., *Can the girls who make cakes can make biscuits) would be coded as a
structure-dependence error (although see the discussion of this point in the results section).
For this reason, errors of the former type were coded separately as structure dependence +
agreement errors.6
 Unclassified error: Errors that did not fit into any of the aforementioned categories but that,
nevertheless, preserved the semantics of the target question were coded as unclassified.
Such responses include those with determiner omission or duplication, or omission of the
relativizer (except for correct short form questions or structure-dependence errors).
 Excluded: Questions that did not preserve the semantics of the target question (e.g., where
the child substituted nouns or main verbs, or used an NP with the incorrect number) or that
did not have the syntax of a complex question (i.e., that did not have all the appropriate
syntactic constituents in the correct positions) were excluded. Restarting errors (Crain &
Nakayama’s, 1987, Type 2 errors; e.g., Can the boy who can run fast, can he jump high?
were scored as excluded for this latter reason (although a count was kept, to allow for
comparison with Crain & Nakayama’s, 1987, data). This category also includes trials for
which children produced a statement rather than a question, began to ask a question and
then gave up, and so on.
All transcribed responses were coded by both the first two authors. The two coders agreed
on the classification of all but 13 of the 352 individual trials (96%). All of these disagreements
potentially affected coding, but the transcribers were able to reach agreement for all trials,
with disagreements representing either confusion regarding the grounds for a response to be
scored as excluded, or simple misreadings of the transcribed responses.
1.2. Results and discussion
Table 2 summarizes the results of Experiment 1. Note that the mean percentages shown
here (and referred to in the text) represent the means of percentages calculated for individual
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Table 2
Classification of children’s question productions for Experiment 1 (CAN questions)
% of all Responses % of Valid Attempts
Coding Category Example Number M SD M SD
Correct questions (full
form)
Can the boys who can run
fast jump high?
151 42.90 37.12 58.78 35.07
Short-form “correct”
questions
Can the boys who run fast
jump high?




Can the boy who runs fast
jump high?
7 1.99 4.48 2.68 5.62
Auxiliary-doubling errors Can the boys who can run
fast can jump high?
49 13.92 16.47 23.97 25.88
Structure dependence
errors
Can the boys who run fast
can jump high?
16 4.55 9.08 7.92 12.82





Can the boy who runs fast
can jump high?
4 1.14 4.15 1.78 5.74
Unclassified errors Can boy who can run fast
jump high?
3 0.85 2.92 1.34 4.13
Restarting Type 2 errors
(excluded)
Can the boys who can run
fast, can they jump
high?
38 10.80 23.56 na na
Other excluded responses 75 21.31 27.25 na na
form) as a percentage of valid attempts (58.78%) does NOT represent the percentage of the
total number of valid trials for which any child gave a correct response; that is, 100*(151/(352
– 38 – 75)) = 63.2%. Rather this figure was arrived at by calculating a percentage-correct
(full form) score for each child, and then taking the mean. These two different figures are the
same for the column headed “% of all responses” because all children contributed the same
number of TOTAL responses (i.e., 16), even if some were subsequently excluded, but not for
that headed “% of valid responses” as many children contributed less than 16 VALID (i.e.,
non-excluded) responses.
The first point to note is that a mean of 79% of all questions were categorized as preserving
the semantics of the target question (a mean of 32% were excluded, but 11% of these constituted
Type 2 errors, which preserve the semantics of the target question). Questions that were either
excluded or categorised as unclassified errors are shown in Appendix B (which can be
found online at http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/Supplemental/index.html). Inspection
of these errors reveals that even many of the excluded trials appear to constitute attempts at
the appropriate question, even though they may contain several different errors. Thus we can
be reasonably confident that children understood the semantics of the target questions. The
mean rates of correct question production (59% of valid attempts), auxiliary-doubling (Type 1)
error (25%) and restarting (Type 2) error (11% of all responses) were very similar to the rates
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Table 3
Distribution of structure dependence errors among participants for Experiment 1 (CAN questions)
Child SD Errors (of Which Plural Questions) Valid Attempts (Maximum = 16) % StDep Errors
A 1 (0) 6 16.67
B 3 (2) 10 30.00
C 1 (1) 8 12.50
D 6 (3) 14 42.86
E 1 (1) 8 12.50
F 2 (2) 7 28.57
Overall, 16 structure-dependence errors were observed (not counting structure dependence
+ agreement errors); a mean rate across children of 5% of all responses and 8% of valid
attempts at the appropriate question (i.e., as a percentage of all questions except those classified
as excluded). Two children were excluded from this latter calculation, as they produced no
valid attempts at the appropriate question. The 16 structure-dependence errors can be found
in Appendix C.
Table 3 shows the distribution of structure-dependence errors amongst participants. It is
notable that over a quarter of the participants made at least one such error. Thus whilst structure-
dependence errors are by no means frequent, they would seem to be made by a reasonably high
proportion of children, at least for questions with the modal auxiliary CAN. It should be noted
that, for CAN questions, some structure-dependence errors with a plural subject (e.g., can the
boys who run fast can jump high?) could alternatively be analysed as auxiliary-doubling errors
(can NP can jump high?) with a short-form relative clause (the boys who run fast as opposed
to the boys who CAN run fast).7 However, if some of children’s apparent structure-dependence
errors are actually auxiliary-doubling + short-form errors, then one would expect to find that
(errors that have the surface form of) structure-dependence errors are more frequent for plural
than singular CAN questions. This is because an auxiliary-doubling + short-form error will
yield (a string with the surface form of) a structure-dependence error for a plural CAN question
(e.g., Can the boys who run fast can jump high?) but not a singular CAN question (e.g., Can
the boy who runs fast can jump high). In fact, structure-dependence errors were almost as
common for singular (7 errors) as plural (9 errors) CAN questions, corresponding to mean
rates of 7% and 9% of all scorable responses, respectively. Thus if structure-dependence errors
with plural CAN questions are excluded as ambiguous (and trials with plural CAN questions
therefore removed from the denominator), the mean rate of structure-dependence errors (as a
proportion of scorable responses) barely changes, dropping from 8% to 7% (the mean rate as
a proportion of ALL responses drops from 6% to 4%).
Although the SRN studies discussed did not investigate questions with the modal auxiliary
CAN, they would seem to predict more structure-dependence errors with plural than singular
subjects. This is because, whilst both contain legal bi-grams in the crucial position (e.g., who
crawl), structure-dependence errors with plural subjects (15), but not singular subjects (16)
contain legal tri-grams (underlined) in this position:
15. The babies who can crawl can walk → Can the babies who crawl can walk?
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As we have seen, structure-dependence errors were observed at a similar rate for singular
and plural questions (seven and nine errors, respectively). Although this difference was not
significant, evaluation of the above prediction is probably not possible with so few errors for
each sentence type.
However, the study of Reali and Christiansen (2005) found that, when using the transi-
tional probabilities of word bi- and tri-grams to calculate a measure of the probability of
occurrence of particular sentences (cross entropy), correctly formed complex questions were
assigned a higher probability value than corresponding structure-dependence errors, regard-
less of whether bi- or tri-gram statistics were used. In fact, although correctly-formed complex
questions were significantly more probable than corresponding structure-dependence errors
using either the bi- or tri-gram statistics (both at p = .0001), the magnitude of this difference
in probability was slightly greater using the bi-gram (t[99] = 15.03) than tri-gram statistics
(t[99] = 11.74).8
In summary, the findings of Experiment 1 suggest that Crain and Nakayama (1987) are
premature in their conclusion that children never make structure-dependence errors in com-
plex question formation (although such errors are rare). A further implication is that the
absence of such errors in the study of Crain and Nakayama (1987) may partly reflect the fact
that these authors elicited questions with copula/auxiliary is, for which structure-dependence
errors strongly violate the transitional probability statistics of English. Implicit in this latter
claim are the assumptions that young children are sensitive to the transitional probability
statistics of the input data, and that their sentence productions are affected by this im-
plicit knowledge. The goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether the patterning of
a relatively frequent error type—auxiliary-doubling errors—would provide support for these
assumptions.
2. Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether children’s auxiliary-doubling errors
would pattern as predicted by the computer simulations of Lewis and Elman (2001) and
Reali and Christiansen (2005) and, in doing so, to test the plausibility of the claim that
children—like these simulations—may be protected from structure-dependence errors by
surface co-occurrence patterns in the input data.
As Table 2 shows, around a quarter of all valid responses made by children in Experiment
1 were auxiliary-doubling errors (e.g., ∗Can the boys who can run fast can jump high?). The
SRN models discussed also, in effect, make auxiliary-doubling errors: If given a string such
as Is the boy who is smoking . . . (or Is the boy . . . ) early in training, the models predict
the next item to be an auxiliary (e.g., is) with relatively high probability. For the models,
these “auxiliary-doubling errors” are a consequence of the fact that the learning mechanism
is initially misled by the high frequency of strings such as [NP] [AUX] [NP] in the input
(although the simulation of Lewis & Elman, 2001, does not “see” categories such as NP or
AUX, but creates internal representations that may approximate to these categories). Although
such errors are quite persistent, they eventually cease because questions in the input provide
evidence that an auxiliary is not an appropriate prediction for strings beginning with an
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Table 4
Auxiliary-doubling errors in Crain and Nakayama (1987)
Lexical-Category String
Created by Insertion of Frequency (Manchester
Auxiliary-Doubling Error Extra Auxiliary/Copula Auxiliary-Doubling Errors Corpus Mothers)
Is the dog that is sleeping is on
the blue bench?
PART BE (COP) PREP 2 1
Is the ball that the girl is sitting
on is big?
PREP BE (COP) ADJ 6 1
Is the boy who is watching
Mickey + Mouse is Happy?
NOUNa BE (COP) ADJ 8 252
Is the boy who is unhappy is
watching Mickey + Mouse?
ADJ BE (AUX) PART 4 2
Is the boy who is being kissed by
his mother is happy?
NOUNa BE (COP) ADJ 8 252
Is the boy who was holding the
plate is crying?
NOUNa BE (AUX) PART 11 757
aTo give a conservative estimate of the frequency of these strings, only common nouns were included in the
corpus search.
Since the SRN models make auxiliary-doubling errors because of the presence of certain
category combinations in the input, it follows that, if learning proceeds in a similar manner
for children, the rate of such errors will be high for questions where this error results in a
high-frequency category combination (e.g., [NOUN] [BE] [ADJECTIVE]; Is the boy who
is being kissed by his mother is happy?) and low for questions where this error results in a
less frequent combination (e.g., [PARTICIPLE] [BE] [PREPOSITION]; Is the dog that is
sleeping is on the blue bench?). This prediction is not shared by the innate-constraint view
(Crain & Nakayama, 1987), under which children form yes/no questions using movement
rules that are explicitly NOT formed on the basis of the input data.
In fact, Crain and Nakayama’s (1987) own results provide some support for the prediction
that rates of auxiliary-doubling error will be highest where the “inserted” auxiliary forms
part of a relatively high frequency category combination. Table 4 shows the total number of
auxiliary-doubling errors made for each of the test sentences elicited in Crain and Nakayama’s
Experiment 1. For each auxiliary-doubling error, the word tri-gram containing the “inserted”
auxiliary is underlined; the corresponding lexical categories are shown in the second column.
Table 4 reveals that auxiliary-doubling errors that resulted in the category combination of
[NOUN] [BE] [ADJECTIVE] or [NOUN] [BE] [PARTICIPLE] were over twice as common
as auxiliary-doubling errors that resulted in the combinations [PARTICIPLE] [BE] [PREPOSI-
TION], [PREPOSITION] [BE] [ADJECTIVE] or [ADJECTIVE] [BE] [PARTICIPLE] (27 vs.
12 errors). A search of the maternal data of the Manchester Corpus (Theakston, Lieven, Pine,
& Rowland, 2001) yielded 757 sentences of the form [PROPER NOUN] [BE3sg] [PARTICI-
PLE], and 252 of the form [PROPER NOUN] [BE3sg] [ADJECTIVE]. In contrast, this cor-
pus contained only two instances of the combination [ADJECTIVE] [BE3sg] [PARTICIPLE]
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Table 5
Example target question types for Experiment 2 (BE questions)
Target Question
Match–Mismatch Number Feature and (in Parentheses) Category Combination Relative Frequency
of Number of NP in Auxiliary- Generated by Auxiliary- of Category
Features of NPs Main Clause Doubling Error Doubling Error Combination
Match Singular Is the boy that is washing
the elephant (is) tired?
NPsingular is ADJ High
Plural Are the boys that are
washing the elephants
(are) tired?
NPplural are ADJ High
Mismatch Singular Is the boy that is washing
the elephants (is) tired?
NPplural is ADJ Low
Plural Are the boys that are
washing the elephant
(are) tired?
NPsingular are ADJ Low
nations [PARTICIPLE] [BE3sg] [PREPOSITION] and [PREPOSITION] [BE3sg] [ADJEC-
TIVE] (The whole point of going is for you to see if you like it; That bit underneath is yellow).
It is impossible to be sure, however, that this pattern of results is driven by the frequency
of particular category combinations, because these sentences differ along other dimensions
(e.g., simple length, and whether the relative clause modifies the subject or the object). The
aim of Experiment 2, then, was to elicit minimal pairs of sentences where the frequency of the
relevant category combination varied, but sentence length and structure were held constant. In
order to achieve this, we varied the frequency of the category combinations by manipulating
the number features of the two NPs and their agreeing auxiliary verbs as illustrated by the
example target sentences in Table 5.
Although the relevant category combinations are at a more fine-grained level than those
previously discussed (e.g., NPsingular is ADJECTIVE as opposed to NP AUXILIARY AD-
JECTIVE) this does not affect the prediction of the modelling accounts. The SRN model of
Lewis and Elman (2001) is not presented with category information, but is able to generate
its own fuzzy probabilistic categories at all levels from individual lexical items (e.g., is) to
those approximating to higher order categories (e.g., BE → AUX → NP → VP and so on). It
is clear that combinations such as NPsingular is ADJECTIVE (e.g., elephant is tired) are more
frequent than those such as NPplural is ADJECTIVE (e.g., elephant are tired) as the former
are common in simple sentences whereas the latter are illegal except in complex sentences or
complex NPs.
The prediction from SRN models, then, is that auxiliary-doubling errors will occur at a
higher rate for questions where such an error results in a higher frequency category combination
(NPsingular is ADJECTIVE or NPplural are ADJECTIVE) than a lower frequency combination
(NPplural is ADJECTIVE or NPsingular are ADJECTIVE). The primary goal of Experiment 2
was to test this prediction. A second aim was to investigate whether Crain and Nakayama’s
(1987) finding of no structure-dependence errors for BE questions would be replicated. As
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less frequent for BE than CAN questions, as such errors violate the transitional probability
statistics of English more strongly for the former than the latter. A third aim was to investigate
whether, should such errors in fact be observed, they would be more frequent for sentences
with the plural (are) than the singular (is) form of copula/auxiliary BE. Although there is some
evidence to suggest that children are more proficient at forming questions with auxiliary is
than are (e.g., Ambridge et al., 2006), Crain and Nakayama used only the singular form; a
fact that may have contributed to their finding of no structure-dependence errors.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Participants were 33 normally developing monolingual English-speaking children (19 girls
and 14 boys) aged 4;7 to 5:7 (M = 5; 1), recruited from schools in the North West of England.
It was decided to recruit younger participants for Experiment 2 than Experiment 1 in order to
increase the likelihood of observing high overall rates of auxiliary-doubling error (the elicited
production study of Ambridge et al, 2006, found relatively low rates of doubling-error with
auxiliary BE for simple questions). The participants for Experiment 2 were also closer in
age to those studied by Crain and Nakayama (M = 4;3). A further three children did not
understand the experimental procedure of putting questions to the dog and so were excluded,
but all of the remaining 33 children produced at least one attempt at a complex question during
the warm-up, and so were included.
2.1.2. Design
The experiment used a 2 × 2 within-subjects design. The first factor (match–mismatch)
corresponded to whether the number features of the NP in the main clause and the NP in the
relative clause were the same (both singular or both plural) or different (one singular and the
other plural). The second factor was simply whether the NP in the main clause was singular
or plural. Crossing these factors resulted in four target-question types, examples of which are
shown in Table 5. Four questions of each type were generated, for a total of 16 items (see
Appendix D).
2.1.3. Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that for Experiment 1.
2.1.4. Transcription and coding
Reponses were again recorded onto minidisc, then transferred to computer for subsequent
transcription. For this study, both the first two authors served as experimenters. Data collected
by the second author were transcribed by the first author, while data collected by the first
author were transcribed by a research assistant. One hundred and twelve of the 528 individual
trials (21%, randomly selected) were additionally transcribed (by the first or second author,
or the research assistant) for reliability analysis. The two transcribers reached agreement for
103 of these 112 trials (95%). Four of the nine mismatches affected coding as they involved a
relevant auxiliary, NP or relativizer whilst five did not (e.g., superfluous determiners). In each
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All transcribed responses were then scored by both the first two authors. Each response
was again assigned to one of a number of mutually exclusive categories. The basic coding
scheme was the same as that used for Experiment 1, although a number of modifications were
made in order to take account of a number of errors that were specific to one or other of the
experiments:
 Short-form (correct) questions were not subdivided into short-form and short-form +
agreement questions, as no child produced an utterance with agreement marked on the
main verb (e.g., Is the boy who wash-es elephants tired?). Similarly, the category of
structure dependence + agreement error was not used, as no child produced an utterance
such as Is the boy who washes the elephant is tired?
 To be counted as an auxiliary-doubling error, both NPs and the lexical main verb had to be
exactly of the form modelled (although, again, substitutions of which or that for who were
permitted). However, for some auxiliary-doubling errors the child “changed” the form of
the extra auxiliary to create a spurious local agreement (e.g., Is the boy who is washing the
elephants are tired?). Such utterances were coded as auxiliary-doubling errors but were
flagged to allow them to be removed from some analyses. For some trials, children created
a spurious local agreement by changing not the auxiliary, but the final NP (e.g., Is the
boy who is washing the elephant is tired? [where three elephants were pictured]). Because
errors where the child changes the number of either NP do not preserve the semantics of
the target question, all such errors (regardless of whether they would otherwise have been
scored as auxiliary-doubling errors) were excluded. Auxiliary-doubling errors where the
child changed the number of the first or second auxiliary (e.g., Is the boys who are washing
the elephants are tired?) were counted simply as auxiliary-doubling errors (as such errors
do not affect the strings under investigation, and do not alter the semantics of the target
question).
 Errors with incorrect number marking on any auxiliary were scored as unclassified unless
already classified as auxiliary-doubling or structure-dependence errors.
Again, all children’s questions were coded by two coders (the first two authors). Although
the authors initially disagreed on the coding of 46 of the 528 individual responses (an agreement
rate of 91%) they were able to reach agreement for all of these responses, as all disagreements
were simple cases of one coder failing to notice a particular error.
2.2. Results and discussion
Table 6 summarizes the percentage of children’s questions that were classified into each of
the different coding categories. One child was excluded from the mean percentage of valid
attempts calculation, as he produced no valid attempts at the appropriate question.
For this study, a mean of 74% of trials constituted attempts at a semantically appropriate
question (i.e., a mean of 28% of trials were excluded, with 2% of these Type 2 errors),
although the rate of unclassified errors (17%) was much higher than for Experiment 1. This
is probably due to the fact that the participants of Experiment 2 were around 20 months
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Table 6
Classification of children’s question productions for Experiment 2 (BE questions)
% of all Responses % of Valid Attempts
Coding Category Example Number M SD M SD
Correct questions (full
form)
Is the boy who is washing
the elephant tired?
141 26.70 28.61 33.83 34.17
Correct questions (short
form)
Is the boy washing the
elephant tired?
52 9.85 21.88 13.66 27.87
Auxiliary-doubling errors Is the boy who is washing
the elephant is tired?
74 14.02 22.64 18.20 28.87
Structure dependence
errors
Is the boy who washing
the elephant is tired?
24 4.55 8.88 6.64 12.65
Unclassified errors Is the boy who is washing
elephant is tired?
90 17.05 20.51 27.67 31.83
Restarting Type 2 errors
(excluded)
Is the boy who is washing
the elephant, is he tired?
11 2.08 5.10 na na
Other excluded responses 136 25.76 23.06 na na
be found online at http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/Supplemental/index.html). Again,
there appear to be few questions that suggest that children did not comprehend the procedure
or the target question. For this study, the rate of correct-question production (27%) was
considerably lower than that observed in Crain and Nakayama’s (1987) Experiment 1 (60%),
with rates of auxiliary-doubling (14%) and restarting errors (2%) also somewhat lower than
those observed by Crain and Nakayama (23% & 9%).
Surprisingly, given the results of the SRN simulations of Lewis and Elman (2001) and
Reali and Christiansen (2005), structure-dependence errors (see Appendix F) were observed
at a rate similar to that for CAN questions (5% of all questions, a mean rate across children
of 7% of all valid attempts). Structure-dependence errors were predicted to be less frequent
for BE questions, as such errors include very low frequency bi-grams (e.g., who running),
whereas corresponding errors with CAN questions contain more frequent combinations (e.g.,
who run). Table 7 displays the distribution of these errors amongst participants. It is notable
that again over a quarter of the children studied produced one or more structure-dependence
error; a proportion similar to that observed for CAN questions. We return to this finding at the
end of this section.
The fact that structure-dependence errors were observed allows us to investigate a second
possibility; that such errors are more frequent with the plural (are) than the singular form
(is) of copula/auxiliary BE. Data from studies of children’s simple-question production (e.g.,
Ambridge et al., 2006) suggest that children are more proficient at forming questions with
is than are, raising the possibility that the rate of structure-dependence errors in Crain and
Nakayama’s (1987) study may have been lowered by the decision of these authors to elicit
only singular BE questions. Of the 24 structure-dependence errors observed in our second
experiment, 15 had plural subjects with copula are, and six singular subjects with copula
is (the remaining three included one instance of is and one of are). Although this differ-
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Table 7
Distribution of structure dependence errors among participants in Experiment 2 (BE questions)
Child SD Errors (of the Form are. . . are vs. is. . . is) Valid Attempts (Maximum = 16) % StDep Errors
A 3 (3 vs. 0) 9 33.33
B 2 (2 vs. 0) 13 15.38
C 1 (1 vs. 0) 15 6.67
D 4 (0 vs. 2*) 13 30.77
E 1 (0 vs. 1) 5 20.00
F 5 (5 vs. 0) 11 45.45
G 4 (4 vs. 0) 12 33.33
H 1 (0 vs. 0*) 13 7.69
I 3 (0 vs. 3) 15 20.00
Note. Child D (2 errors) and Child H (1 error) made structure dependence errors with one singular (is) and one
plural (are) form; see Appendix F.
suggestion that Crain and Nakayama’s finding of no structure dependence errors may have
been partly caused by their decision to use singular (is) BE questions, with which children
are perhaps more proficient than plural (are) questions. Planned comparisons between is. . . is
questions and questions with one or more auxiliary are were conducted to investigate this
issue. In support of this suggestion, significantly more correctly-formed questions were pro-
duced for is. . . is questions (M = 1.48 out of a maximum of 4, SD = 1.60) than are. . . are
(M = 0.81, SD = 1.21, t = 2.37, p = .02), is. . . are (M = 1.06 SD = 1.34, t = 2.10,
p = .05) or are. . . is (M = 0.90, SD = 1.35, t = 2.20, p = .04) questions, which did not differ
significantly.
The SRN models of Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005) predict
that auxiliary-doubling errors will be more common when such errors result in the formation
of higher frequency category strings (e.g., elephant is tired, elephants are tired) than lower
frequency strings that are found only in sentences with complex syntax or complex NPs (e.g.,
elephants is tired, elephant are tired). Table 8 shows the mean number of auxiliary-doubling
errors made by children for each question type elicited in Experiment 2 (out of a maximum
of 4)
A 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of match vs. mis-
match, F (1, 32) = 6.77, p = .01, η2p = 0.18, demonstrating that children made significantly
more auxiliary-doubling errors for sentences where such errors resulted in the formation of
a higher frequency category combination (M = 0.67, SD = 1.13) than a lower frequency
combination (M = 0.46, SD = 0.90). This ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of
main-clause-NP-number, F (1, 32) = 5.93, p = .02, η2p = 0.16, such that (perhaps surpris-
ingly) children made significantly more auxiliary-doubling errors with singular (M = 0.67,
SD = 1.14) than plural (M = 0.45, SD = 0.88) main clause subjects. These two factors
were not found to interact significantly (F = 0.66, p = .42). The finding of more auxiliary-
doubling errors for singular than plural subjects is potentially consistent with the Lewis and
Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005) models. Although in the input data, the
transitional probability between a singular NP and a singular auxiliary is probably approx-
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particular singular NPsingular+ AUXsingular strings have a higher chunk frequency than similar
NPplural+ AUXplural strings (simply because, intuitively, singular subjects are more common
that plural subjects).
If this turns out to be the case, then this offers a ready explanation for the finding of more
auxiliary-doubling errors for is than are.
However, this pattern of results is somewhat distorted by the fact that children made more
valid attempts at questions with a match (a mean of 3.00, SD = 1.10, out of a maximum of
4) than a mismatch (M = 2.77, SD = 1.35) between the numbers of the NPs in the main
and relative clauses, and at questions with a singular (M = 2.92, SD = 1.30) than plural
(M = 2.85, SD = 1.15) NP in the main clause (these figures include all children). Table 9
shows, for each of the four question types elicited, the mean number of auxiliary-doubling
errors, the mean number of valid attempts at the appropriate question, and the mean proportion
of auxiliary-doubling errors. Five children were excluded from these calculations, as they failed
to produce at least one valid attempt for one or more of the four question types (including
the one child who made no valid attempts at the appropriate question throughout the entire
experiment).
A 2 × 2 ANOVA calculated for the proportion of valid attempts at questions that constituted
auxiliary-doubling errors revealed a significant main effect of match vs. mismatch, F (1,
27) = 8.37, p = .007, η2p = 0.24, demonstrating that children made a significantly greater
proportion of auxiliary-doubling errors for target questions where such errors resulted in the
formation of a higher frequency category combination (M = 0.24, SD = 0.36) than a lower
frequency combination (M = 0.17, SD = 0.30). No other main effects or interactions were
observed. This suggests that the previous finding of significantly more auxiliary-doubling
errors for singular than plural questions might have been partly caused by the trend toward
more valid attempts at singular than plural (with respect to the main-clause NP) questions.
While, as discussed in the method section, questions in which the number feature of
either NP differed from the target were excluded (because this changes the semantics of
the question), the figures reported so far include auxiliary-doubling errors where the child
“changed” the form of the extra auxiliary to create a spurious local agreement (e.g., *Is the
boy who is washing the elephants are tired). Such errors in fact represent around 15% of all
the auxiliary-doubling errors that occurred in Experiment 2. Such errors are consistent with
the prediction that children will produce more auxiliary-doubling errors where this results in a
higher frequency category combination, as “changing” the auxiliary to create a spurious local
agreement results in a higher frequency category combination. However, the inclusion of such
responses as auxiliary-doubling errors actually reduces the likelihood of the predicted effect
being observed: When children “change” the form of the extra auxiliary, this more often has
the effect of creating a spurious local agreement for a mismatch sentence (e.g., the elephants is
tired → the elephants are tired), rather than removing such an agreement that would otherwise
have been present for an auxiliary-doubling error with a match sentence (e.g., the elephant is
tired → the elephant are tired). Thus the inclusion of such responses as auxiliary-doubling
errors artificially inflates the rate of errors for mismatch sentences (because children are, in
effect, converting them into match sentences). For a third analysis, then, we removed every
auxiliary-doubling error where the inserted auxiliary was not of identical form to the auxiliary
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(for a total of seven exclusions) who “changed” the inserted auxiliary for every auxiliary-
doubling error for one particular question type (mismatch, singular main clause NP, in both
cases). In practice, the exclusion of such errors made little difference to the pattern of results.
Again, a 2 × 2 ANOVA calculated for the proportion of valid attempts at questions that
constituted auxiliary-doubling errors revealed a significant main effect of match (M = 0.21,
SD = 0.35) vs. mismatch (M = 0.13, SD = 0.27; F [1, 25] = 7.64, p = .01, η2p = 0.23) but no
other significant main effects or interactions (the effect was reduced in size despite the removal
of auxiliary-change errors because 2 fewer subjects contributed scores to the analysis).
In summary, the results of Experiment 2 support the prediction of Lewis and Elman’s
(2001) and Reali and Christiansen’s (2005) SRN simulations that auxiliary-doubling errors
will be more frequent when such errors create higher frequency category combinations. A
non-significant trend for a higher rate of structure-dependence errors with are than is questions
was also observed.
We now return to the finding that, counter to the prediction derived from the models of Lewis
and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005), structure-dependence errors appeared
to be no more frequent for CAN than BE questions. It is important to note that our two studies
are not directly comparable, as they differed with respect to the age of the participants, and
to the particular questions elicited. Nevertheless, due to the importance of this prediction, we
decided to compare the rates of structure-dependence errors observed with CAN (Experiment
1) and BE (Experiment 2) questions statistically. The raw rates of structure-dependence error
were identical for both experiments (4.55%) and so were not compared statistically. The mean
rates of structure-dependence error as a proportion of all valid attempts at the correct question
were 7.92% (SD = 12.82) for CAN questions (Experiment 1) and 6.64% (SD = 12.65) for BE
questions. An independent samples t-test found no significant difference between these error
rates, t(1, 50) = 0.35, p = .73.
As noted in the results section of Experiment 1, comparing rates of structure-dependence
error for plural questions is problematic, because such errors have an alternative analysis
for CAN questions (as auxiliary-doubling errors with a short-form relative clause) but not
BE questions. Excluding all questions with a plural subject or auxiliary form leaves seven
structure-dependence errors for CAN questions, and six for BE questions. Although these
numbers are too small to compare meaningfully, the finding of similar rates of structure-
dependence error for CAN and BE questions therefore remains unchanged.
3. General discussion
The goal of the present studies was to reassess Chomsky’s (1980) and Crain and Nakayama’s
(1987) claims that (a) children never make structure-dependence errors when forming complex
questions and that (b) the absence of such errors necessarily implies that structure dependence
is an innately specified constraint, in light of the results of the SRN studies of Lewis and
Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005).
Given that, in even the largest currently available child corpora, we have no recorded
attempts at complex yes/no questions, the only previous evidence in support of the claim that
children do not make structure-dependence errors is the elicited production study of Crain and
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errors are inconsistent with the semantics of the target question), this study used only auxiliary
is, with which even young children are relatively proficient at forming questions, and consisted
of only 220 trials (as opposed to 880 in the present study). In fact, when a large number of
trials were elicited with a wider range of auxiliaries (is, are, and can) in the present studies, 40
structure dependence errors were observed (only 6 of which contained 2 instances of auxiliary
is, as in the questions elicited in Crain & Nakayama’s, 1987, Experiment 1). Although rates
of structure-dependence error were never high, over a quarter of all children studied produced
at least one such error.
It would be possible in principle to explain away the observed structure-dependence errors
as production errors. One could argue, for example, that such errors constitute auxiliary-
doubling errors with the second of the three auxiliaries omitted or not phonologically realized
(e.g., Is the boy who 0is [*] washing the elephant is tired?; see Footnote 7) or, in the
case of plural CAN questions (e.g., Can the boys who run fast can jump high?), simple
auxiliary-doubling errors (analogous to, for example, Can the boys can jump high?) that
are indistinguishable on the surface from structure-dependence errors. Once one assumes,
however, that children’s elicited production data reflect performance factors rather than gram-
matical competence, empirical data such as those reported by Crain and Nakayama (1987)
become irrelevant to the question of whether or not structure dependence is an innately spec-
ified constraint. If any structure-dependence errors observed can be dismissed as production
errors, then the finding of an error rate of zero (as reported by Crain & Nakayama, 1987)
has no different theoretical consequences to the finding of an error rate of 5%, or of 25%.
We do not wish to claim, however, that the structure-dependence errors observed are a con-
sequence of children having formed an incorrect rule such as move the first auxiliary to
sentence-initial position (Chomsky, 1980); in fact we do not accept the claim that questions
are formed by a movement rule (see Ambridge et al., 2006). Thus, whilst we accept that the
observed errors are, in some sense, “performance errors,” this does not entail acceptance of the
claim that children have been born with (or even acquired) a structure-dependent movement
rule.
This brings us to Chomsky’s (1980) and Crain and Nakayama’s (1987) second claim
that the absence (or very low rate) of structure-dependence errors constitutes evidence that
structure dependence is an innately specified constraint. The SRN studies of Lewis and Elman
(2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005) demonstrate that, in principle at least, even a
learner that does not have structure dependence as an innately specified constraint can avoid
making structure-dependence errors in complex question formation, on the basis of surface-
distributional properties of the input data. The present Experiment 2 provides evidence that
young children are sensitive to the surface distributional properties of their input, as such
properties can explain the patterning of children’s auxiliary-doubling errors. Thus it seems that
children are indeed in possession of a learning and/or production mechanism that is influenced
by transitional probability statistics of the input data; statistics that are, in principle, sufficient
to protect the learner against the production of structure-dependence errors. It simply does
not follow, then, that even the finding of an error rate of zero would necessarily imply the
existence of an innately specified principle of structure dependence.
Leaving aside the empirical data, however, many authors have made the theoretical argument
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contain sufficient information in principle for the learner to form the structure-dependent
representations necessary for correct complex question formation (Chomsky, 1980). The
studies of Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005) demonstrate that this is
not the case. These models do not have structure dependence as an innate constraint, yet they
do not make structure-dependence errors, and in fact learn to make predictions corresponding
to well-formed questions. Whether or not these models are psychologically plausible, they
nevertheless demonstrate that input that does not contain any examples of complex questions
can in principle contain sufficient information for children to learn to ask correctly formed
complex questions.
What, then, is the relationship between innate constraints and data-driven learning, with
respect to structure dependence? We can see three possibilities. The first is that the principle of
structure dependence is indeed, as claimed by Chomsky (1972), “an innate schematism applied
by the mind to the data of experience” (p. 30). Neither the present study nor those of Lewis and
Elman (2001) or Reali and Christiansen (2005) demonstrate that structure dependence is not
an innate constraint (although it is difficult to see how any study could do so, even if it were
not). What these studies do demonstrate, however, is that both the empirical and theoretical
arguments that have previously been put forward to support the innate-constraint account (at
least with regard to complex questions) are flawed.
The second possibility is that the input data interacts with some kind of innate structure to
achieve the end-state grammar. Yang (2002) proposes a model of “language acquisition as a
population of competing grammars, whose distribution changes in response to the linguistic
evidence presented to the learner” (p. 12). Under this proposal, children’s innate endowment
consists of a set of parameters (e.g., whether a language has wh-movement or allows sub-
jects to be dropped) that are set on the basis of the input data. This approach differs from
other parameter-setting accounts (e.g., Fodor, 1998; Hyams, 1986) in that parameters are not
“triggered” by a single input datum. Rather, at any one time the learner has a number of
different grammars—each specifying a particular setting for each parameter—which compete
stochastically: Grammars (or more properly their associated parameter settings) that success-
fully parse input sentences are rewarded, thus increasing the likelihood of their being selected
to parse subsequent sentences, while those that do not are punished. Eventually the learner
arrives at a stable grammar (or grammars) corresponding to a set of parameter settings that
can correctly generate any required utterance.
Yang (2002, pp. 109–114) specifically addresses the question of structure dependence in
yes/no questions, asking whether the input data contain sufficient evidence to allow the learner
to make a “binary choice” (p. 110) between a rule such as “front the first auxiliary verb in the
sentence” (p. 109) and the correct, structure dependent rule. Yang claims, on the basis of data
presented in Valian (1991), that English-speaking children learn that English is not a subject-
drop language by age 3;0, and that sentences that provide evidence for this (“signatures,”
Yang, 2002, p. 104), specifically those with pure expletive subjects (e.g., There is a man in
the room), constitute 1.2% of all adult sentences in CHILDES. Yang goes on to argue that,
in order for children aged 3;0 to have learned that the structure-dependent version of the
question formation rule is the correct one, sentences providing evidence for this fact (e.g., Is
the boy who is in the corner smiling? or How could anyone that was awake not hear that?,
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such sentences is apparently only “approximately 0.03%” (Yang, 2002, p. 112), yet children
aged 3;0 do not make structure-dependence errors (Crain & Nakayama, 1987), Yang (p. 114)
concluded (quoting Chomsky, 1975, p. 33) that “the principle of structure dependence is not
learned, but forms part of the conditions for language learning.”
Yang’s (2002) argument, however, is logically flawed. Even if one accepts the claim
that an expletive-subject rate of 1.2% is sufficient for children to learn that English re-
quires subjects, this does not entail that a similar rate of complex questions is necessary
to acquire the principle of structure dependence. Indeed, the models of Lewis and Elman
(2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005) make predictions corresponding to correctly-
formed complex questions, avoiding structure-dependence errors, in the absence of any
complex questions in the input. In any case, the empirical findings of the present study
render Yang’s argument irrelevant. If, as we have shown, young children do make structure-
dependence errors then there is no reason to posit an innate constraint to explain why they
do not.
The third possibility is that structure-dependence is not an innate constraint, but that the child
acquires a structure-dependent grammar because she forms her grammar on the basis of the
input data, which exhibits this property (e.g., Stemmer, 1981). For example, there is no reason
in principle why the child could not learn that simple NPs (e.g., the boy) and complex NPs
(e.g., the boy who is smoking) can be substituted for one another on the basis of a distributional
analysis of the input. For example, in declarative sentences both simple and complex NPs will
appear before many of the same auxiliaries (e.g., is, can, does), before verbs marked for tense
and agreement (e.g., likes, played), after prepositions (e.g., I looked at/spoke to), and so on.
Then once the child has learned to ask simple yes/no questions (perhaps by acquiring a yes/no
question construction such as [AUXILIARY/COPULA] [NP] [VERB/ADJECTIVE]?) she can
form a complex question by substituting a complex NP for a simple NP. Many theorists reject
out of hand the possibility that children could conduct such a distributional analysis (e.g.,
Pinker, 1987), but this is to ignore a considerable body of evidence that demonstrates that even
pre-linguistic infants are sensitive to surface distributional properties of the input data (e.g.,
Gomez & Gerken, 1999; Maye & Weiss, 2003; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Experiment
2 of the present study demonstrates that young children are sensitive to such properties in the
domain of complex question formation.
Furthermore, the SRN simulations of Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen
(2005) predict the correct structure for complex questions in a very similar way.9 In effect,
they learn that strings such as the boy and the boy who is smoking can be substituted for one
another, on the basis that they share similarities in their surface distributions (i.e., both predict,
and are predicted by, the same items). It is premature to reject out of hand the possibility that
children could do something similar, particularly as they also have another source of evidence
that simple and complex phrases can be substituted for one another that is not available to the
SRN models; namely functional or semantic information. For many complex phrases (e.g., the
boy who is smoking) there exists a simple phrase (e.g., the boy) that denotes the same referent
and/or serves the same function. Of course, claiming that children can substitute complex
NPs for simple NPs in questions is a restatement of the principle of structure dependence.
The point is that it is a restatement that conceptualizes structure dependence as a learnable





































248 B. Ambridge, C. F. Rowland, J. M. Pine/Cognitive Science 32 (2008)
Indeed, moving away from the specific example of complex yes/no questions, any evidence
that simple and complex phrases can be substituted for one another constitutes evidence (at
least in principle) that language has the abstract property of structure dependence. Even an
utterance as simple as I want the ice cream. I want it! constitutes evidence that language has
constituent structure, whereby strings of arbitrary length that share certain properties can be
substituted for one another (and could be seen as a “signature” of structure dependence under
accounts such as that of Yang, 2002).
One advantage of this kind of learning account is that the same mechanism that explains
how children learn to correctly produce complex yes/no questions (on the whole, avoiding
structure-dependence errors) also accounts for the precise pattern of auxiliary-doubling errors
observed for such sentences. Although some versions of the innate-constraint account can
explain why auxiliary-doubling errors are common (e.g., because they reflect a process such
as movement without deletion; Crain & Nakayama, 1987) such accounts currently have no
explanation for the particular patterning of these errors.
One potential problem for this learning account is that it cannot explain the present finding of
approximately equal rates of structure-dependence error for CAN and BE questions, predicting
instead a lower rate for the latter. One possibility is that this account is simply incorrect. An
alternative possibility is that more structure-dependence errors might have been observed for
BE than CAN questions had the participants of the former study not been older (by around
20 months) than those of the latter. A third possibility is that functional-semantic similarities
between simple and complex phrases play a more important role than surface-distributional
similarities in demonstrating to children that simple and complex phrases can be substituted
for one another (i.e., that language is structure dependent).
The most significant implication of this learning account is that arguments about whether
or not the input might contain some small percentage of complex yes/no questions (e.g.,
Pullum & Scholz, 2002; Yang, 2002) are not directly relevant to the question of whether the
child could learn to form such questions without an innately specified principle of structure
dependence. Under this account, the child does not need to hear any complex questions in
order to be able to produce them correctly. The studies of Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali
and Christiansen (2005) demonstrate that even input that contains no complex questions can
contain, in principle at least, sufficient evidence to allow the learner to infer the correct form
of such questions.
It is also important to note that under a version of this learning account where chil-
dren acquire questions as an independent construction (e.g., [AUXILIARY/COPULA] [NP]
[VERB/ADJECTIVE]?; Ambridge et al., 2006; Rowland & Pine, 2000), movement rules
that derive questions from declarative utterances (or similar) play no role. Under this view,
the question of whether children might incorrectly formulate a structure-independent rule
(e.g., move the first auxiliary to the front of the sentence) does not arise, because chil-
dren do not form questions by “moving” any auxiliary. Thus the claim that because chil-
dren do not (often) make structure-dependence errors, this principle must be an innately-
specified constraint simply does not follow given a different set of assumptions about the
adult endpoint.
Of course, no single study can address all the issues that arise from this controversial
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area. One major finding of the present study was that, counter to the prediction derived from
the SRN models of Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005), structure-
dependence errors were no more frequent with BE than CAN questions. However, the present
study did not compare rates of structure-dependence error for these auxiliaries with a sin-
gle group of children. Future experimental work should address this shortcoming. Further
computer modelling work should also be conducted in order to quantify the predicted dif-
ference in rates of structure-dependence error (and auxiliary-doubling error) for different
auxiliaries.
Another unexpected finding was that rates of auxiliary-doubling error were relatively high,
constituting around a quarter of all valid questions produced. Similar studies with simple
questions (Ambridge et al., 2006; Guasti, Thornton, & Wexler, 1995) have found that auxiliary-
doubling errors are virtually non-existent for positive questions with the auxiliaries BE and
CAN. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the questions in the present study
included much longer noun phrases between the fronted auxiliary and the gap from which
it notionally moved. This raises the possibility that the redundant auxiliary might represent
some kind of resumptive form (similar to Type 2 errors such as Can the boy who can run
fast, can he jump high?). This NP-length explanation is consistent with an account whereby
auxiliary-doubling errors represent memory failure, with the child “defaulting” to an item that
has high transitional probability (e.g., an auxiliary following a NP). Because the strength of
representation of a particular item in a SRN decays over time, one might expect models of the
type investigated by Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and Christiansen (2005), which make
auxiliary-doubling errors, to also show this NP-length effect. Future computer modeling work
could be used to make predictions regarding the extent to which rates of auxiliary-doubling
error increase as a function of NP length (and perhaps lexical auxiliary), which could then be
tested on children.
As we discussed, the SRN models would appear to predict more structure-dependence
errors with plural than singular subjects for questions with auxiliary CAN because, whilst
both contain legal bi-grams in the crucial position (e.g., who crawl), structure-dependence
errors with plural subjects contain legal tri-grams (e.g., babies who crawl). The present study
found only a non-significant trend in this direction (9 vs. 7 errors). However, the study of
Reali and Christiansen (2005) found that, for some question types at least, tri-gram statistics
are no more useful than bi-gram statistics in predicting the correct structure. Future computer
modelling work, focussing on auxiliary CAN, should be conducted to determine whether, in
fact, a higher rate of structure-dependence errors is to be expected for plural than for singular
CAN questions, and future experimental work with children should investigate whether this
is the case. Any study comparing rates of structure-dependence error would have to include
either a large number of trials or a large number of participants because such errors are so
infrequent.
In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated that the claim that children simply do
not make structure-dependence errors in complex question formation (Crain & Nakayama,
1987) is false. Our findings, together with those of Lewis and Elman (2001) and Reali and
Christiansen (2005) also call into question the conclusion that low or zero rates of structure-
dependence error necessarily imply that the principle of structure dependence is part of
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question production is influenced by surface distributional properties of their input; properties
that, in principle at least, could be used to infer the correct structure of complex yes/no
questions.
Notes
1. In this article, as is conventional in the relevant literature, the term auxiliary is used
to refer to the copula and the modal auxiliaries as well as true auxiliaries. In fact,
in the structure dependence literature, copula and auxiliary BE are generally treated as
interchangeable. For example, Crain and Nakayama (1987) stated that “all test sentences
contained two occurrences of the auxiliary verb is” (p. 528), although one of the two
occurrences of is was in fact a copula in all but one of the test sentences.
2. Another possible movement rule based on linear order—move the final auxiliary to
sentence initial position—outputs an ungrammatical question from statements such as,
The girl is kissing the boy who is smoking. As Yang (2002, p. 109) noted, there are,
in principle, an infinite number of possible rules (e.g., “Front the auxiliary verb whose
position in the sentence is a prime number”), but this concern is not relevant here.
3. The categories presented to the model were noun, verb (including auxiliaries), adjective,
numeral, adverb, determiner, pronoun, preposition, conjunction, interjection, complex
contraction, abbreviation, infinitive marker, and proper name.
4. To check that strings such as who run are indeed more frequent in the input data than
strings such as who running, we searched the British National Corpus for the example
strings who run/who smoke and who running/who smoking. The respective frequencies
were 165, 53, zero, and zero. Thus, although strings like who smoking are not, strictly
speaking, “illegal” (e.g., Is the boy who smoking offends still here?; Gualmini & Crain,
2004, p. 4), it is probably fair to say that they have a frequency of approximately zero.
Note that these figures represent chunk frequencies (i.e., the frequency of a particular
string) as opposed to transitional probabilities (i.e., the probability of occurrence of a
certain word, given the previous word). The two measures are highly correlated, and
the transitional probability between two items that, together, have a chunk frequency of
zero (e.g., who running) will also be zero. Reali and Christiansen’s (2005) bi-/tri-gram
analysis used transitional probability statistics.
5. These errors actually have three auxiliaries. We term them auxiliary-doubling errors
because they have the appearance of errors in which the child has duplicated the
auxiliary from either the main or relative clause (although we explicitly do NOT wish to
claim that this extra auxiliary has been duplicated via some process such as movement
without deletion), and because they are analogous to errors in simple questions (e.g.,
Does she does[n’t] like Coke?) that are commonly termed auxiliary-doubling errors in
the literature (see Ambridge et al., 2006; Guasti, Thornton, & Wexler, 1995).
6. This term is used purely descriptively. We do not wish to imply that children are actually
making a structure-dependence error and erroneously inserting the agreement-marking
–s morpheme, and we do not include such errors in our counts of structure-dependence
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analysed as auxiliary-doubling errors with a short-form relative clause. The point in using
the descriptive term auxiliary – doubling + agreement error is to highlight the fact that
the equivalent form for a sentence with a plural subject does constitute a structure-
dependence error (although, see the discussion of this point in the results section).
7. It is interesting to note that a similar proposal is put forward by Santelmann, Berk,
Austin, Somashekar, and Lust (2002, p. 819) who argued that apparent non-inversion
errors in simple yes/no questions (e.g., dat’s the owner for is dat the owner?) could
instead “represent both auxiliary ‘overmarking’ [i.e., doubling, B.A.] and ‘omission’ of
the initial auxiliary: is dat’s the owner?” and thus that such “errors . . . cannot be taken
as conclusive evidence either for or against grammatical knowledge of inversion.”
8. Although this finding may seem somewhat counterintuitive, it is not difficult to think of
an example where the transitional probabilities associated with a particular bi-gram are
higher, on average, than those associated with a tri-gram containing that bi-gram. For
example, the bi-gram What did will have a higher average transitional probability than
the tri-gram What did John. This is because What is usually followed by one of a small
number of closed-class items (i.e., auxiliaries) whereas (What) did can be followed by
a potentially infinite number of different subjects.
9. Although in saying this we explicitly do NOT mean to claim that children necessarily
actually employ SRN-like mechanisms. The point is simply that the SRN studies
discussed demonstrate that the input data can contain information that is sufficient
in principle to allow children to infer the correct structure of (at least some types of)
complex yes/no questions.
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Appendix A
Target questions for Experiment 1
Transitivity No. of Subjects Target Question
Intransitive Singular Can the boy who can run fast jump high?
Can the girl who can dance sing?
Can the baby who can crawl walk?
Can the bird that can swim fly?
Intransitive Plural Can the boys who can run fast jump high?
Can the girls who can dance sing?
Can the babies who can crawl walk?
Can the birds that can swim fly?
Transitive Singular Can the boy who can play the piano play the guitar?
Can the monster that can eat people eat elephants?
Can the man who can drive cars drive tractors?
Can the girl who can make cakes make biscuits?
Transitive Plural Can the boys who can play the piano play the guitar?
Can the monsters that can eat people elephants?
Can the men who can drive cars drive tractors?
Can the girls who can make cakes make biscuits?
Appendix C: Structure dependence errors observed in Experiment 1
Can babies who crawl can walk?
Can birds that swim can fly?
Can girls that make cakes can make biscuits?
Can girls who dance can sing?
Can monsters that eat people can eat elephants?
Can <monsters eat> [//] monsters that eat people can eat elephants?
Can the baby which crawl can walk?
Can the bird that swim can fly?





































254 B. Ambridge, C. F. Rowland, J. M. Pine/Cognitive Science 32 (2008)
Can the boy who jump [/] who run fast can jump high?
Can the boys that jump high can run fast?
Can the boys who run fast can jump high?
Can the girl who dance can sing?
Can the girl who make cakes can make biscuits?
Can the men that drive cars can drive tractors?
Can the monster who eat people can eat elephants?
Appendix D
Target questions for Experiment 2
Match–Mismatch of Number Number Feature of
Features of NPs NPs in Main Clause Target Question
Match Singular Is the boy that is washing the elephant tired?
Is the girl that is brushing the dog kind?
Is the cat that is chasing the mouse naughty?
Is the lion that is eating the man hungry?
Plural Are the boys that are washing the elephants tired?
Are the girls that are brushing the dogs kind?
Are the cats that are chasing the mice naughty?
Are the lions that are eating the men hungry?
Mismatch Singular Is the boy that is washing the elephants tired?
Is the girl that is brushing the dogs kind?
Is the cat that is chasing the mice Is the lion that is
eating the men hungry?
Plural Are the boys that are washing the elephant tired?
Are the girls that are brushing the dog kind?
Are the cats that are chasing the mouse naughty?
Are the lions that are eating the man hungry?
Appendix F: Structure dependence errors observed in Experiment 2
Are cats who chasing the mice are naughty?
Are cats who chasing the mouse are naughty?
Are lions who scaring the man are hungry?
Are the boys that washing the elephants are tired? (3 children)
Are the boys who washing the elephant are tired?
Are the cats that chasing the mice are naughty? (2 children)
Are the cats who chasing the mice are naughty?
Are the cats who chasing the mouse are naughty?
Are the girls that brushing the dog are kind?
Are the girls that brushing the dogs are kind?
Are the girls that washing the dog is kind or not?
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Are the lions who eating the man are hungry?
Is cat what catching the mouse is naughty?
Is the cat that chasing the mice are # naughty?
Is the cat that chasing the mice is naughty?
Is the cat that chasing the mouse is naughty?
Is the girl that brushing the dogs is kind?
Is the lion that eating the man is hungry?
Is the lion that eating the men are hungry?
Is the lion that eating the men is hungry?
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